Predicting performance on fluid intelligence from speed of processing, working memory, and controlled attention

Fluid inteliigence has been defined as an innate ability to reason which is measured commonly by the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM). Individual differences in fluid intelligence are currently explained by the Cascade model (Fry & Hale, 1996) and the Controlled Attention hypothesis (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002). The first theory is based on a complex relation among age, speed, and working memory which is described as a Cascade. The alternative to this theory, the Controlled Attention hypothesis, is based on the proposition that it is the executive attention component of working memory that explains performance on fluid intelligence tests. The first goal of this study was to examine whether the Cascade model is consistent within the visuo-spatial and verbal-numerical modalities. The second goal was to examine whether the executive attention component ofworking memory accounts for the relation between working memory and fluid intelligence. Two hundred and six undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 28 completed a battery of cognitive tests selected to measure processing speed, working memory, and controlled attention which were selected from two cognitive modalities, verbalnumerical and visuo-spatial. These were used to predict performance on two standard measures of fluid intelligence: the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) and the Shipley Institute of Living Scales (SILS) subtests. Multiple regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) were used to test the Cascade model and to determine the independent and joint effects of controlled attention and working memory on general fluid intelligence. Among the processing speed measures only spatial scan was related to the RPM. No other significant relations were observed between processing speed and fluid intelligence. As 1 a construct, working memory was related to the fluid intelligence tests. Consistent with the predictions for the RPM there was support for the Cascade model within the visuo-spatial modality but not within the verbal-numerical modality. There was no support for the Cascade model with respect to the SILS tests. SEM revealed that there was a direct path between controlled attention and RPM and between working memory and RPM. However, a significant path between set switching and RPM explained the relation between controlled attention and RPM. The prediction that controlled attention mediated the relation between working memory and RPM was therefore not supported. The findings support the view that the Cascade model may not adequately explain individual differences in fluid intelligence and this may be due to the differential relations observed between working memory and fluid intelligence across different modalities. The findings also show that working memory is not a domain-general construct and as a result its relation with fluid intelligence may be dependent on the nature of the working memory modality.

Exploring the experience of the pioneers of change

The world of work with Western society appears to be undergoing a major change. The literature has described this phenomenon as a change from an industrialbased economy to a knowledge-based economy. This change will represent a complete transformation of the world of work; some suggest that everything we have come to accept and know as normal will change. Our present society seems to be in a period of transition. It is a time with many challenges and problems, many of which cannot be solved with thinking patterns from an old industrial-based economy. A fundamental shift in thinking patterns consistent with a new emerging world of work must take place. This change in thinking represents a fundmental shift from traditional and linear ways of seeing the world (worldview), to more holistic ways of seeing the world. In this investigation the word paradigm was used to define how people see their world. A paradigm shift is defined as a change in how a person sees their world: a change from an old to new or different way of viewing the world. Those individuals who are the first to shift their paradigm are called paradigm pioneers. These individuals do not only shift their ways of seeing the world, but they also begin to act and behave in ways consistent with the new paradigm. Thus far the research literature has adequately described the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts. However, little is known regarding how people actually and eventually make a shift. As it will be important for each individual to make a personal paradigm shift, then it will be extremely valuable to learn more about the process itself. The purpose of this investigation was to explore these issues in more detail and specifically, describe the experience of paradigm shifts and explore the experience of paradigm pioneers. A qualitative research methodology involving in-depth interviews was used to investigate the experiences of four participants identified as paradigm pioneers. It is interesting to note that the participants in this study did not describe an allencompassing paradigm shift. In fact, each participant, defined a paradigm shift in several different ways. They did relate several examples of paradigm shifts. However, even among these examples, there was a high degree of variability. The findings of this investigation centered upon the participants' experience as pioneers. Each pioneer shared many of the same qualities, the first quality of which described how these pioneers dealt with change. I called this a change-sense quality. The pioneers viewed change in an open and positive manner, and were also aware of change taking place in their world. Finally, they displayed an understanding of change, and a bias to take positive action in the face it. The participants also shared an inner quality. The four pioneers demonstrated a personal purpose and vision, and were selfdirected individuals. They also had an innate curiosity which translated into a love of learning. They also displayed a quality where relationships with others were highly valued. Relationships were important to the pioneers because they played a support role to help them deal with the challenges of being a pioneer. Pioneers also valued relationships because, they relied on others to make change happen. The above mentioned qualities enabled pioneers to be effective in a changing world of work. The findings from this investigation have many implications for research and practice. First, the concept of paradigms and paradigm shifts must be further researched. A great deal more must be learned in order to better understand the kind of shift individuals must make to be effective in the new world of work. Second, the qualities displayed by pioneers are important for all members of the world of work to develop. The qualities shared by pioneers appeared to represent an enduring set of traits that can possibly help individuals deal more positively with uncertainty and rapid change taking place in today's North American world of work.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Manpower development and nation-building : Singapore's experience

Manpower is a basic resource. It is the indispensable means of converting other resources to mankind '.s use and benefit. As a process· of increasing the knowledge, skills, and dexterity of the people of a society, manpower development is the most fundamental means of enabling a nation to acquire the capacities to bring about its desired future state of affairs -- a more mighty and wealthier nation. Singapore's brief nation-building history justifies the emphasis accorded to the importance of good quality human resources and manpower development in economic and socio-political developments. As a tiny island-state with a poor natural resource base, Singapore's long-term survival and development depend ultimately upon the quality and the creative energy of her people. In line with the nation-building goals and strategies of the Republic, as conditioned by her objective setting, Singapore's basic manpower development premise has been one of "quality and not quantity". While implementing the "stop-at-two" family planning and population control programs and the relevant immigration measures to guard against the prospect of a "population explosion", the Government has energetically fostered various educational programs, including vocational training schemes, adult education programs, the youth movement, and the national service scheme to improve the quality of Singaporeans. There is no denying that some of the manpower development measures taken by the Government have imposed sacrifice and hardship on the Singapore citizens. Nevertheless, they are the basic conditions for the island-Republic's long-term survival and development. It is essential iii to note that Singapore's continuing existence and phenomenal-success are largely attributable to the will, capacities and efforts of her leaders and people. In the final analysis, the wealth and the strength of a nation are based upon its ability to conserve, develop and utilize effectively the innate capacities of its people. This is true not only of Singapore but necessarily of other developing nations. It can be safely presumed that since most developing states' concerns about the quality of their human resources and the progress of their nation-building work are inextricably bound to those about the quantity of their population, the "quality and not quantity" motto of Singapore's manpower development programs can also be their guiding principle.

Exploring Gifted Adults' Perception of Giftedness in their Pursuit of Graduate Education

This qualitative study explores 8 gifted adults' perceptions of their own giftedness and how those perceptions influenced their pursuit of graduate education as revealed by retrospective interviews. This study serves to inform the existing literature surrounding giftedness especially as it relates to gifted individuals across the lifespan and their experiences and perceptions of education at all levels. This study also provides insight into the emotional impact being labeled gifted has on an individual's self-concept and academic identity. The major themes that emerged using the interpretive phenomenological analysis method (Smith & Osborn, 2003) were discussed under five main headings: Evolution of Giftedness, Success and Failure, Expectations, Effort, and Doubt and Proof. An adaptation of the listening guide method (Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg, & Bertsch, 2003) was used to provide a unique and personal perspective of the phenomenon of giftedness and revealed the feelings behind the themes that emerged in the interpretive phenomenological analysis method. Specifically; this study illuminates the lack of evolution that an individual's understanding and perception of giftedness undergoes across the lifespan, and the impact such a static and school-bound understanding has on gifted adults' self-concept. It also reveals the influence that gifted individuals' innate need to achieve has on their academic aspirations and their perceptions of themselves as gifted. Furthermore, it reveals how important the understanding and internalization of failure can be on the self-concept of gifted individuals, and that this issue needs immediate attention at all levels of education.